~~FARE~~FACT EVASION

HOW THE MAYOR DOUBLED EVASION, HALVED ENFORCEMENT, AND BURIED THE DATA

A REPORT BY NEIL GARRATT AM

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How the Mayor doubled evasion, halved enforcement, and buried the data.

A REPORT BY NEIL GARRATT AM   LONDON ASSEMBLY   JULY 2026

Compiled from TfL board and panel papers, press releases, Freedom of Information responses, Mayor's Question Time answers, and London Assembly Transport Committee correspondence. All figures are TfL's own unless stated. Full sources are listed at the end.

Dedicated to the TfL staff and police who place themselves on the front line of tackling fare evaders, suffering verbal abuse, threats, and physical violence simply for trying to maintain good order on the transport network. You, above all, deserve a true and accurate picture of the problem you do so much to tackle. Thank you all.

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FOREWORD

WHAT IS THE TRUTH ABOUT FARE EVASION IN LONDON?

On 15th June 2026, Mayor Khan launched a £7 million plan to tackle the "dark blizzard of disinformation" which he claimed is giving people a false impression of London. An accusation that looks like a confession.

Just five days earlier, he had announced the positive results of the first year of his "bold new plan" to tackle fare evasion. If there are 100 people in your Tube carriage then 5 of them didn't pay; in total these free riders cost London £190m per year so it's a problem that needs tackling. But it doesn't feel like it's getting better, so is the Mayor right to say his plan is working?

On his new plan, the Mayor claimed that "new figures show that it's working" when in fact they showed it made no difference: fare evasion was unchanged at 3.5% of journeys. Nor was the plan new: I've discovered it was a 2025 relaunch of a 2023 plan. And it was the opposite of "bold", as it had relaxed the fare evasion target from 1% to 1.5% and pushed the deadline back 6 years. Conveniently putting it beyond his term in office.

Figure 1 — Mayor of London tweet on fare evasion crackdown, 10 June 2026, claiming "new figures show that it's working".

Yet all this information was missing from both the Mayor's statement and Transport for London's press release, giving Londoners a false picture that things had improved when they had not. It's hard to believe this was by accident as TfL holds all this information.

If the headline announcement can be so misleading, what about the blizzard of claims about fines, prosecutions, and numbers of enforcement staff intended to create the impression they're pulling out all the stops. The Mayor's claimed crackdown. Was that true?

I recruited the help of the world's most powerful AI, Claude Fable 5, and went digging. I found TfL data on fare evasion and enforcement going back decades, back through Mayor Khan's decade, beyond Mayor Johnson to Mayor Livingstone. However, it appears that someone erected an information firewall in 2022: as we emerged from the pandemic, TfL resumed fare enforcement and discovered that evasion had shot up. Fortunately, the prior record can be painstakingly reassembled from historic documents, which is what I have done.

Across the whole network, prosecutions are half what they were before the pandemic, from around 29,000 to around 14,000. London Underground penalty fares have also roughly halved, from around 24,000 to around 13,000. Worse, only about 45% of TfL penalty fares are actually paid, as it turns out the same people who refuse to pay for a ticket also refuse to pay the fine. If the Mayor really is "cracking down", why not prosecute the people who don't pay their fine? TfL win 96% of prosecutions as they hold such strong evidence.

Meanwhile, despite repeated claims to be hiring more enforcement staff, the number is the same today as 15 years ago, at around 500 people. The record suggests it has been between 450 and 500 for decades, despite the network growing and getting busier. All the claims to be recruiting enforcement staff seem to be natural turnover, not extra people.

But this is deeper than one or two overly ebullient press releases. The London Assembly Transport Committee investigated fare evasion in July 2025 and when we directly asked for previous data to give context to the new figures, we were flatly told by senior TfL staff that TfL "did not consistently track or measure levels of fare evasion" before 2022/23. Was that true?

There was a change to methodology in 2022, but TfL has not explained what changed or what effect that had on the numbers. Was the new data higher or lower, and by a lot or a little? Across all modes or just one or two? When public authorities change the way important statistics are calculated, it's good practice to publish both sets of figures for an overlapping period to allow researchers to understand the impact. TfL did not do this, either.

The true picture that emerges is that TfL decided to ignore fare evasion during the pandemic, so it spiralled out of control. Many people noticed this. In the years since, TfL has never regained control, and the fact that fines and prosecutions are running so far behind the pre-pandemic level suggests it has not been a Mayoral priority.

Instead, what I have found is a pattern of exaggerated, misleading, or even false claims combined with a data transparency strategy of making it hard to find the pre-2022 data that exposes the reality.

> **Perhaps the most important finding is that on numerous occasions in the past, fare evasion has been successfully reduced. When TfL took over the Overground, they reduced its evasion from 12.6% to 1.8% in four years.**

From 2005 to 2016, across the whole network it was cut by two-thirds to 1.2%, so Mayor Khan's "bold" target of 1.5% by 2031 is higher than the level he inherited in 2016. Nevertheless, it has been done before so there's no reason they can't repeat that now, but it's harder to do that when the Mayor's approach seems to rest on covering up what's really happening. If the Mayor isn't moved to transparency, in 2010 a TfL Committee ordered quarterly publication and could do so again.

Therefore, following on from my colleague Thomas Turrell's report on fare evasion in November 2025 ("Stolen Millions"), this report attempts to penetrate that blizzard with some bright sunlight, and makes recommendations on publishing data that will mean everyone can clearly see what is going on in the hope that we can get back on track. If a better approach to publication costs slightly more, perhaps some of the £7 million "tackling disinformation" budget could cover the cost.

So this is a report in two halves. The first half consists of this foreword and section 1 which set out the overall problem then seek to tackle it at source with a plan for Transport for London to publish information routinely in a consistent, comparable fashion, including rates of evasion, action being taken, rate by mode, and performance against their own targets. This is all information that TfL has published in the past.

The second half acts as a repository, bringing together for the first time every piece of data I could find, forming the most comprehensive ever picture of fare evasion across the London transport network. The recommendations are designed to ensure that no one ever has to do this again.

SECTION 1 · THE FIX

01 RECOMMENDATIONS: A STANDARD FOR HONEST REPORTING

1.1 WHATSHOULD BE PUBLISHED

1 **Publish a standing minimum data set on fare evasion, annually, to a fixed specification.** As a minimum: the network rate and every mode's rate; the network and mode-level targets and performance against them; the complete historical series TfL holds, with any measurement gap shown explicitly rather than dropped; estimated revenue lost on one consistent, dated basis; enforcement staffing in FTEs by role, distinguishing net new posts from replacement of turnover; penalty fares issued and the collection rate — both the number and value paid versus issued, by mode, as TfL last published in 2003; and prosecutions, convictions and the conviction rate, with programme cost set against revenue recovered. Almost all of this was routinely published between 2006 and 2012, but little of it is published now.

2 **Report the headline rate with its margin of error, and never present movement within that margin as a trend.** TfL's own Underground surveys of 2010–12 published sample sizes (about 45,000 passengers) and both gross and net measures; the same discipline should apply to the journey-based measure, so that claims such as a "trajectory in the right direction" are checkable.

3 **Publish the mode-level targets, restoring them to the annual Budget and Business Plan, and publish the revenue protection targets and performance in each rail concession and franchise.** And include the analysis behind the strategy: the top evasion locations, ITAP volumes, and the share of evasion attributable to repeat offenders — all data a "data led" strategy would lead with.

1.2 RULES THAT KEEP THE DATA HONEST

4 **Maintain target integrity through a standing committee instruction.** Report against every target until it is met or formally, publicly and explicitly revised, with the reason and decision-maker recorded. The relevant TfL committee should adopt a standing instruction requiring the quarterly and annual publications above, as the Finance and Policy Committee did in November 2010 (action 49/11/10). This ensures that no target and no data series can be changed or discontinued without a minuted committee decision. Every published series in this record that died, died silently: this rule makes silent death impossible.

5 **Preserve comparability and restate the record.** Publish the measurement methodology; when it changes, publish old and new bases for at least one overlapping year. As a one-off, publish a restatement of the historical record TfL holds: the 2005–2016 survey series, the 2017–2019 update promised in writing in May 2020 and never delivered, the pre-pandemic estimates released by FOI, and the board-published figures of 2003–2016, and account for the 2017–2022 gap: either the surveys continued (publish them) or a decision was taken to stop measuring (say who took it, and when).

6 **Distinguish activity from outcomes, new from continuing, and benchmark every superlative.** Announcements should state the baseline, the target and the latest outcome against it; separate genuinely new measures from continuations; and any claim of a "record" or "highest ever" must state its comparison period against the full series TfL holds.

7 **Adopt an external standard and independent assurance.** Produce fare evasion figures in line with the UK Code of Practice for Statistics, ideally through voluntary application overseen by the Office for Statistics Regulation, and give the London Assembly access to the underlying data.

1.3 WHERE AND HOW OFTEN

8 **Give fare evasion reporting a permanent, prominent home:** a fixed, recurring chapter of the annual Travel in London report, and reinstatement of the quarterly fares avoidance appendix to the Board's performance report. This also delivers, through a proven mechanism, the "performance dashboards within TfL's quarterly reports" called for in Thomas Turrell AM's recommendation 9. TfL does not need to invent this, it just needs to switch it back on.

9 **Publish proactively, permanently, and machine-readably.** Release the minimum data set as an open dataset so the facts no longer have to be extracted through FOI, and maintain this at a stable URL.

10 **Close the loop on enforcement that does not deter.** Publish each year the penalty fare collection rate by mode, as TfL did in 2003, when non-payment ran at 15–30 per cent against more than 50 per cent today, and what happens to unpaid fares. If the stated policy of prosecuting non-payment is not being applied at scale, say so and explain why. A £100 fine that most recipients never pay should not be reported as a deterrent without that context.

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SECTION 2 · THE EVIDENCE IN BRIEF

KEY FINDINGS

1 TfLhas set **three successive fare evasion targets since 2019**, and has never publicly acknowledged missing any of them: a 2019 commitment to halve evasion by 2024; a 2022 plan reported as reducing evasion to 1% of journeys by 2024/25; and the current target of 1.5% or less, announced as "by 2030" and now stated as "by the 2030/31 financial year".

2 The outturn for 2024/25, the deadline year of the 2022 plan, was **3.5% — three and a half times the 1% target**. No TfL or Mayoral statement acknowledging or withdrawing that target has been traced.

3 The "new" 1.5% target announced on 30 April 2025 was **at least 18 months old**: it was stated to the Board in October 2023 ("two-thirds, to under 1.5 per cent by 2030") and to the Assembly in a written MQ in November 2024. TfL's own June 2025 Commissioner's Report calls the April 2025 strategy "refreshed"; no document can be found specifying the difference between the 2023 and 2025 strategies.

4 In 2025/26, the first full year of the April 2025 strategy, the network rate **did not fall: 3.5% to 3.5%**. On the Underground it rose from 4.8% to 5.0%. The 10 June 2026 press release presented rising enforcement activity but omitted the flat headline rate.

5 Setting numeric targets and publishing them used to be TfL's normal practice. The 2007/08 business plan published a network average bus fare evasion target of below 3.2% (and a 95% prosecution success target); the 2009/10 Budget published bus irregularity targets of 1.4% and 8.3%; the Overground concession carries a contractual 2% ticketless travel target and the DLR franchise a 3% compensation trigger. The current refusal to publish mode-level targets is **a departure from TfL's own history**.

6 Enforcement peaked long before the pandemic. In 2008/09 TfL successfully prosecuted **26,002 people** (21,225 bus; 4,777 Tube) and issued 95,980 penalty fares (75,193 bus; 20,787 Tube) — just bus and Tube. Today's "record" **14,406 convictions** (2025/26, all modes) is barely half the 2008/09 figure. Even the 29,113 prosecutions in 2019/20 points to falling enforcement on a twenty-year view because that covers the whole network.

7 More than half of TfL's penalty fares now go unpaid, and it doesn't seem to be improving: **50.5% unpaid in 2023/24, 55.4% in 2024/25, 54.5% in 2025/26**. TfL's 2003 board papers quantified non-payment at 15% (Underground), 30% (buses) and 20% (Tramlink): today's network-wide non-payment is roughly double the worst mode of twenty years ago.

8 TfL's estimate of revenue lost has risen from "more than £130m" a year (April 2025) to **"circa £190m"** (June 2026). Its own FOI dates the £190m back to 2023/24, while press releases were still citing £130m. The long-run series shows the cash loss was broadly stable for two decades before almost trebling after the pandemic: about £50m (2003), £70m (2008/09), £63m (2011), £55.7m net/£86.1m gross (2016).

9 TfL ran a consistent, board-reported measurement regime for **at least 17 years before the pandemic**: quarterly bus surveys (from 2006), thrice-yearly Underground irregularity surveys of ~45,000 passengers, quarterly Overground surveys and per-period DLR/Tramlink counts, plus the 2005–2016 annual survey series. When TfL told the Transport Committee it "did not consistently track or measure levels of fare evasion" before 2022/23, this is hard to square with its own published record.

10 Several times in the past, TfL published this data routinely then stopped, **each time without explanation**. The Finance and Policy Committee ordered quarterly board-level publication in November 2010 (action 49/11/10); "Appendix Five" ran in five successive quarterly reports, then vanished after June 2012. The MQT series (2005–2016) stopped when TfL stopped answering; the 2017–2019 update promised in May 2020 was never provided. The published webpage now starts the record at 2022/23.

11 London has driven fare evasion down **twice before**, on TfL's own evidence. Network-wide, net revenue loss fell from 3.1% of fares income in 2005 to 1.2% by 2014, and stayed there to 2016. On the Overground, evasion fell from 12.6% in 2006/7 to 1.8% by 2010/11 — an 86% reduction TfL presented to the Board as the flagship argument for rail devolution. Every mode is now worse than every pre-2019 figure TfL published.

12 Enforcement strength has been **broadly flat for fifteen years** on TfL's own statements: around 500 revenue inspectors in 2010, "approximately 450" in 2022, "more than 500" in 2026 — across a network that has since added the Elizabeth line. TfL publishes no FTE series, so announced recruitment cannot be distinguished from replacement of turnover.

03 SECTION 3 · THE MOVING TARGET

THE TARGETS: A TIMELINE

3.1 BEFORE2019: TARGETS WERE PUBLISHED

The archive shows that numeric fare evasion targets appeared openly in TfL's published budgets, business plans, and contract papers throughout the 2006–2016 period:

DATE / SOURCE	TARGET	NOTES
2007/08 business plan (Board, 28 Mar 2007)	Network average [bus] fare evasion rate below 3.2%; 95% of prosecutions successful	"Indicators of success" for Bus Enforcement, footnoted to the rolling annual average of the quarterly Fare Evasion Survey
Budget 2009/10 (Board, 31 Mar 2009)	Bus irregularity: 1.4% driver-operated; 8.3% open boarding (12-month rolling)	Published deliverables; footnote confirms continuity: "ticket irregularities are consistent with the measures formerly known as fare evasion"
North London Railway transfer (Board, 29 Mar 2006)	Concessionaire "responsible for meeting specified revenue protection targets"	Silverlink evasion then "high at over 15%"
DLR franchise (per Internal Audit, 5 Mar 2014)	Franchisee compensates TfL if ticketless travel exceeds 3% per quarter	"To date, the level has never exceeded 3 per cent"
Tramlink operating agreement (per Internal Audit, 18 Dec 2013)	Operator required to check ~5% of passenger journeys	—
London Overground concession (Board, 19 Jul 2016)	Contractual ticketless travel target of 2%, with bonus/deduction regime	Set higher initially on newly devolved routes, tightening as stations gated

Two points follow. First, TfL knows how to set, publish and report against evasion targets because it did so as a matter of routine in budgets and contracts. Second, the targets were tied to defined, published measures such as a named survey or a stated averaging basis. This discipline seems absent from the 2019–2026 era.

3.2 2019–2026: A TIMELINE OF THE MOVING TARGET

DATE	WHERE	WHAT WAS SAID
Sept 2019	TfL Board (recounted July 2022)	Pan-TfL Revenue Protection Programme established, with a "medium-term target of reducing the rate of fare evasion by half by 2024". First-year savings of £10m; "on course" until the pandemic.

DATE	WHERE	WHAT WAS SAID
13 July 2022	TfL CSOPP paper; Evening Standard	Renewed crackdown set out in CSOPP panel paper (no press release traced). The Standard reported the plan as reducing evasion to 1% of journeys by 2024/25.
12 July 2023	CSOPP (Board summary, 25 July 2023)	Panel told "TfL had set an ambitious target" (no figure minuted); strategy "would be published this year". The 1% target is no longer mentioned.
18 Oct 2023	Commissioner's Report to the Board	First explicit board-level statement of the current target: launch "later this year... against the target published in our strategy to reduce fare evasion by two-thirds, to under 1.5 per cent by 2030".
5 Dec 2023	CSOPP paper	"An ambitious target has been set to drive down fare evasion to below 1.5 per cent in our TfL Strategy." Past tense indicating new plan now in force. Confirms each mode "develops, agrees, and delivers against an annual plan and target".
2024	Press release (Mar); Commissioner's Reports	No target figure in any public statement through 2024. ianVisits reported the "as low as 1.5%" ambition on 30 July 2024, apparently from TfL briefing.
26 Nov 2024	Written MQT answer 2024/3855	"A target to reduce fare evasion to 1.5 per cent or lower by 2030" is cited five months before the target was "announced".
5 Feb 2025	Commissioner's Report	Pull-quote: "Our target is to reduce the risk of fare evasion by 2030 to less than 1.5%".
30 April 2025	Press release and strategy summary	"Bold new strategy" to halve evasion to "1.5 per cent or less by 2030". Presented as new. Rate quoted as 3.4% using nine months' partial data, but the full year came in at 3.5%. Launched thirty days after the 2022 1% target's deadline expired.
11 June 2025	Commissioner's Report	"In April, we published our refreshed Revenue Protection Strategic Approach...". The "refreshed" clearly relates to the 2023 plan, but what was different? No paper sets out what changed; it appears unchanged, merely reannounced.
2025–26	TfL website; 10 June 2026 press release	Target now stated as "below 1.5 per cent by 2030/31" — a financial year ending April 2031.

1%→ 1.5%

THE TARGET, WEAKENED IN THE DARK

Between July 2022 and April 2025 the target was raised by half and its deadline pushed to **2030/31** — with no press release, no Board decision paper, and no acknowledgement that the 1% target for 2024/25 had been missed more than threefold.

Five observations follow. **First**, the 2022 target was never reported against: within a year of the Standard story it had been replaced internally, and TfL's public statements simply stopped mentioning it.

Second, the 1% target was replaced by a 1.5% target in 2023 without acknowledging that it had been raised, and the deadline pushed back to 2030/31. When the Mayor's term ends in 2028, the latest figure will be 2027 which, even if it's far above the target, allows plenty of scope to argue that things are still on track.

Third, April 2025 was a re-announcement of an eighteen-month-old target, occupying the space where an account of the missed 1% target should have been.

Fourth, the target was adopted and weakened without any public decision: no press release, no Board decision paper, no public announcement between July 2022 and April 2025.

Fifth, internal targets exist but are not published. TfL's strategy summary describes the approach as "target driven", with "clearly defined targets... across each of our modes". None of this seems to have been published, except one which emerged via FOI: an internal Underground target of 4.1% for 2024/25, which was missed with an outturn of 4.8%. Section 3.1 shows this secrecy is new, as mode-level targets used to appear in TfL's published budgets.

SECTION 4 · THE EVIDENCE

04 THE RATES: WHAT THE DATA SHOWS

TfL's published record starts in 2022/23. Since then the headline rate has barely moved — and where it has fallen, the credit belongs almost entirely to two modes.

4.1 NETWORK RATE AND ESTIMATED COST, 2018/19–2025/26

YEAR	NETWORK RATE	ESTIMATED ANNUAL LOSS	SOURCE
2018/19	≈ 2% (by mode, see 4.3)	£116m (incl. ticket fraud)	FOI-2734-1920 (Jan 2020)
2019/20–2021/22	Not measured	Not measured	Surveys paused in pandemic (FOI-2899-2425)
2022/23	3.9%	"circa £130m"	TfL website; FOI-1566-2324
2023/24	3.8% (also stated 3.9%)	£130m–£150m in 2024 statements; "circa £190m" per FOI-0889-2526	TfL website; FOI (Jul 2025)
2024/25	3.5%	"circa £188m" per FOI-0889-2526	TfL website; FOI (Jul 2025)
2025/26	3.5%	"circa £190m"	TfL website; 10 Jun 2026 press release

NETWORK FARE EVASION RATE VS THE 1.5% TARGET



Figure 2 — Network fare evasion rate by year, against the current 1.5% target. Source: TfL website; FOI-0889-2526.

To reach 1.5% by 2030/31 from 3.5% requires roughly 0.4 percentage points of reduction every year for five years. TfL has achieved 0.4 points *in total* over the four years since 2022/23, and zero in the most recent year.

4.2 RATE BY MODE SINCE 2022/23 (YEAR TOTALS)

MODE	2022/23	2023/24	2024/25	2025/26
London Underground	6.7%	4.9%	4.8%	**5.0%**
Buses	1.9%	2.3%	2.6%	2.6%
London Overground	3.6%	3.9%	3.3%	3.3%
DLR	4.6%	4.2%	4.7%	4.0%
Elizabeth line	4.8%	3.8%	3.4%	3.3%
Trams	8.0%	8.0%	7.2%	7.3%
TfL total	**3.9%**	**3.8%**	**3.5%**	**3.5%**

The composition matters. The improvement in the headline rate since 2022/23 is driven almost entirely by the Underground's fall from its post-pandemic spike (6.7% to around 5%) and the Elizabeth line. Bus evasion has risen steadily (1.9% to 2.6%), tram evasion remains around 7–8%, and Underground evasion rose again in 2025/26 to 5.0%. That's one unpaid journey in twenty.

4.3 THE PRE-PANDEMIC MODE ESTIMATES (RELEASED ONLY UNDER FOI)

TfL's published webpage starts the record in 2022/23. Earlier estimates exist and were released under FOI in January 2020 (TfL cautions that each mode used a different method):

MODE	2018/19	2019/20 (TO DEC 2019)
Bus	1.6%	1.86%
London Underground	2.5%	1.9%
DLR	0.56%	0.58%
London Overground	1.34%	1.4%
TfL Rail (west / east)	2.73% / 1.26%	1.99% / 1.15%
Trams	1.5%	1.46%

On TfL's own pre-pandemic estimates, evasion today is roughly double its 2018/19 level on most modes: buses 1.6% then against 2.6% now; the Underground 2.5% then against 5.0% now; the DLR 0.56% then against 4.0% now.

It is unclear why DLR has increased so dramatically; it points to a change in methodology rather than a genuine change in evasion rate, most likely an increase in enforcement activity. Perhaps this is the change in methodology TfL refers to, though they have not said so.

4.4 THE SURVEY SERIES, 2005–2016: EVASION CUT BY TWO-THIRDS

The appendix to MQT answer 2017/4488 (Appendix 4488_14, updating 2016/2153) provides TfL's fare evasion survey results for every year from 2005 to 2016: gross revenue loss, money recovered and net loss, in cash and as a percentage of fares income, by mode. It is the longest consistent series TfL has ever released. The network totals:

YEAR	GROSS LOSS (£M)	GROSS LOSS (%)	RECOVERED (£M)	NET LOSS (£M)	NET LOSS (%)
2005	76.5	3.4%	6.8	69.7	3.1%
2006	76.5	3.2%	11.7	64.8	2.7%
2007	74.9	2.9%	13.8	61.1	2.4%
2008	65.6	2.4%	15.4	50.1	1.8%
2009	68.3	2.3%	13.3	55.1	1.9%
2010	83.8	2.6%	26.4	57.5	1.8%
2011	81.5	2.3%	27.3	54.2	1.5%
2012	76.7	2.0%	28.9	47.9	1.3%
2013	80.2	2.0%	28.9	51.3	1.3%
2014	82.3	1.9%	30.4	52.0	1.2%
2015	83.3	1.9%	29.2	54.0	1.2%
2016	**86.1**	**1.9%**	**30.6**	**55.7**	**1.2%**

NET REVENUE LOSS AS A SHARE OF FARES INCOME — CUT BY NEARLY TWO-THIRDS



Figure 3 — Network net revenue loss (% of fares income), selected years 2005–2016.
Source: MQT 2017/4488, Appendix 4488_14.

Net revenue loss fell from 3.1% of fares income in 2005 to 1.2% by 2014 and held through 2016 — a fall of nearly two-thirds, across two mayoralties, sustained for three years. Recovery grew from 9% of gross loss (2005) to over a third (2016), against low single-digit millions recovered today. One caution within the series: the Underground's gross loss crept back up after 2010 as the low net figure was increasingly held down by recovery money rather than less evasion.

The series has its own damning paper trail. MQ 2016/2153 obtained the original series; MQ 2017/4488 obtained the update; and in March 2020 MQ 2020/1418 asked for 2017, 2018 and 2019 to continue the series. The Mayor's answer of 6 May 2020 stated it was revising its methodology "to provide a more accurate, consistent and comparable measure of revenue loss across the different networks", and would provide the data "once the methodology is finalised". The methodology was finalised — it has been in use since 2022/23 — but the promised data was never provided. And note that the new methodology was billed as providing comparability. TfL's present position is that the change to the method makes comparison impossible, which is the opposite of what was promised in 2020.

4.5 THE BOARD-PUBLISHED RECORD, 2003–2016: RATES BY MODE

Across 13 years, TfL's Board papers contain various numbers provided in an ad hoc way. These use different measures (share of revenue, gross irregularity, ticketless passengers) and are indicative rather than one series, but provide a useful set of snapshots.

MODE	BOARD-PUBLISHED DATA POINTS, 2003–2016	NOW (2025/26)
Bus	2% of revenue, ~£15m (2003); open-boarding routes 7.1%, driver-operated 3.1% → 1.7% after free-travel reform (2005–06 quarterly surveys); network peak 3.5% (2007); 2.2% (2009/10); 1.8% → 1.6% (2011, "lowest in four years"); bendy-bus removal projected to save over £7m a year (2011); "lowest ever levels" (Commissioner, July 2014)	2.6%
Underground	Just over 1% (1994/95, after penalty fares and gating); just under 3%, ~£35m (2003); 4% high (2004); "just over 1 per cent... a new record low" (2009); net revenue loss 0.8–1.6%, gross irregularity 2.2–2.8% (2010–12 surveys of ~45,000 passengers)	**5.0%**
Overground	"Nearly 15%" / "in excess of 18%" pre-transfer (2007); 12.6% (2006/07) → 1.8% (2010/11) — an 86% reduction; 3.8% → 2.7% within months of takeover (2008); ~2% average from summer 2009; 1.69% (Q4 2013/14, "second lowest ever"); West Anglia 14.5% (Jan 2015) → 2.1% (2016)	3.3%
DLR	2.5%, ~£1m (2003); 0.7–1.8% by period (2011/12); never exceeded the 3% contractual trigger to 2014	4.0%
Tramlink	Just under 2%, ~£0.3m (2003); 1.16–1.4% by period (2011/12)	7.3%

The Overground deserves particular prominence. TfL's own September 2016 board paper on rail devolution presents the fall from 12.6% to 1.8% in four years as a headline argument for taking over more services, achieved by gating, staffing every station and enforcement. Together with the 2005–16 series, it is a second well-documented precedent that London drives evasion down fast when it chooses to, using exactly the levers TfL controls today.

It also reframes the "ambitious" 1.5% target for 2030/31: on the measures TfL itself published, most of the network was at or below that level for most of the decade before the pandemic.

4.6 THE MEASUREMENT REGIME TFL RAN FOR TWO DECADES

The archive documents a mature, multi-modal survey architecture, described in TfL's own published papers:

- **Buses:** quarterly independent surveys (February, May, August, November) by a third-party contractor, covering all articulated routes and 32 randomly selected driver-operated routes; results reported to the Board from at least February 2006. The 2006/07 business plan lists the "Quarterly Fare Evasion Survey" as a standing deliverable.
- **Underground:** "Surveys of Passenger Ticket Irregularity" three times a year (February, May, November), sampling ~45,000–46,000 passengers, reporting both gross irregularity and net revenue loss.
- **Overground:** quarterly ticketless travel surveys by a market research company from the start of the concession (2007).
- **DLR and Tramlink:** ticketless travel measured every four-week period from inspection data, with contractual reporting obligations on franchisees.

Against this, the London Assembly Transport Committee was told that before 2022/23 TfL "did not consistently track or measure levels of fare evasion". The record shows a consistent, published, multi-modal measurement regime with named survey months, sample sizes and methodology, running from the mid-2000s until at least 2019/20 (the January 2020 FOI reports survey results to December 2019). The gap is 2020–2022; the silence about 2017–2019 remains unexplained — years for which an update was requested, promised in writing, and never delivered.

> **THE UNANSWERED QUESTION**
>
> Either the surveys continued and the results are unpublished, or someone decided to stop measuring. TfL has never said which, who, or when.

SECTION 5 · BENEATH THE ANNOUNCEMENTS

05 ENFORCEMENT: THE TRENDS BENEATH THE ANNOUNCEMENTS

5.1 THE2008/09BENCHMARK: ENFORCEMENT AT TWICE TODAY'S LEVEL

The Mayor's transport safety strategy *The Right Direction* (Board, 4 November 2010) records: "In 2008/09, TfL successfully prosecuted 21,225 people for fare evasion on the bus network and 4,777 people on the Tube network. In addition, TfL issued 75,193 penalty fares on the bus network and another 20,787 on the Tube" and goes on to mention "around 500 revenue inspectors patrolling the network".

Despite claims about recruitment, this is about the same number of people as today, across a larger network, with significantly fewer penalty fares and prosecutions.

YEAR	SUCCESSFUL PROSECUTIONS (SEE 5.4)	PENALTY FARES ISSUED	SOURCE
2008/09	26,002 (bus and Tube only)	95,980 (bus and Tube only)	The Right Direction, Board paper, Nov 2010
2019/20	29,113 (prosecutions brought)	LU alone: 18,354	FOI via Evening Standard; FOI-2899-2425
2022/23	15,436	Over 54,000	FOI-0889-2526; TfL website
2023/24	18,570	Over 65,000	FOI-0889-2526; TfL website
2024/25	13,823 (down 26% on 2023/24)	Over 63,000	FOI-0889-2526; TfL website
2025/26	**14,406 (convictions)**	**69,001**	**10 June 2026 press release**

SUCCESSFUL PROSECUTIONS PER YEAR — TODAY'S "RECORD" IS HALF THE 2008/09 LEVEL



Figure 4 — Successful prosecutions by year. *2008/09 is bus and Tube only, so the true gap is larger. Sources: The Right Direction (2010); FOI-0889-2526; 10 June 2026 press release.

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"RECORD" ENFORCEMENT, IN CONTEXT

Today's "record" **14,406** convictions is **barely half** the 26,002 of 2008/09 — and that older figure is bus and Tube only, despite today's network carrying more passengers.

The 2008/09 figures are bus and Tube only; adding the Overground, DLR and Tramlink would raise them, while the modern totals cover all modes. On a twenty-year view, today's "record enforcement" is barely half the 2008/09 level of prosecutions and about 28% below its level of penalty fares, on a network carrying more passengers.

5.2 PENALTY FARES AND REPORTS FOR PROSECUTION (ALL MODES, CURRENT ERA)

YEAR	PENALTY FARES ISSUED	IRREGULARITY REPORTS	SOURCE
2022/23	Over 54,000	Over 19,000	TfL website
2023/24	Over 65,000	Over 22,000	TfL website
2024/25	Over 63,000	Over 18,000	TfL website
2025/26	**69,001**	**21,533**	**10 June 2026 press release**

The June 2026 release presents 2025/26 as "a nine per cent increase" in penalty fares and an "18.7 per cent increase" in Irregularity Reports. Both comparisons are against 2024/25, a year in which both measures fell. Against 2023/24, penalty fares are up about 6% over two years and Irregularity Reports are roughly level.

So it is a steady but not dramatic rise as enforcement resumed after the pandemic, to levels still well below where we were in 2008/09 when a genuine crackdown was driving down levels of evasion significantly (see 4.4).

5.3 THE LONGER UNDERGROUND SERIES (VIA FOI)

YEAR	LU PENALTY FARES	LU SUCCESSFUL PROSECUTIONS
2013/14	18,825	not held
2017/18	24,093	3,627
2018/19	24,407	5,166
2019/20	18,354	4,105
2021/22	5,886	1,039
2022/23	10,210	3,434
2023/24	12,907	2,979

YEAR	LU PENALTY FARES	LU SUCCESSFUL PROSECUTIONS
2024/25 (to 7 Dec)	8,771	1,914

On the Underground — the mode with much the largest revenue loss — penalty fares are running at roughly half their 2018/19 volume, and successful prosecutions in 2023/24 (2,979) were below 2017/18 (3,627), let alone 2018/19 (5,166) or the 4,777 of 2008/09.

5.4 PROSECUTIONS VERSUS CONVICTIONS: THE COURTS ARE NOT THE BOTTLENECK

One inconsistency is the change between reporting the number of prosecutions, successful prosecutions, and convictions. I wanted to understand the difference and found FOI-4525-2324 on court outcomes, which gives the answer: the terms can be used almost interchangeably, which might be why TfL themselves switch between them.

Court outcome data in FOI-4525-2324 shows that in 2022/23 TfL secured 15,828 convictions, withdrew 673 cases itself, and lost just 26 — a dismissal rate of 0.16%. In 2023/24 (to 2 March): 16,121 convicted, 712 withdrawn, 43 dismissed. Around 96% of concluded cases end in conviction. TfL prosecutes mainly under its own Byelaws precisely because this enables the Single Justice Procedure.

The constraint on enforcement is how many cases TfL chooses to bring — currently about half as many as in 2019/20. In 2007 TfL published a 95% prosecution-success target, suggesting it has always understood this stage to be near-automatic.

5.5 MOST FINES ARE NEVER PAID

FOI data published on 1 June 2026 shows the share of TfL fines going unpaid has exceeded half for three consecutive years: 50.5% in 2023/24, 55.4% in 2024/25 and 54.5% in 2025/26 (62,849 issued, 34,277 unpaid).

54.5%

FINES NEVER PAID

Morethan half of TfL's penalty fares now go unpaid. Twenty years ago non-payment ran at **15–30%** and TfL published the figure by mode. Today it doesn't.

The penalty fare was raised to £100 in March 2024, which the Mayor explicitly described as "an effective deterrent" — but a fine that most recipients do not pay is not a deterrent. TfL's stated policy since April 2022 is that unpaid penalty fares lead to prosecution for the original offence, but the conviction numbers suggest this is not happening at anything like the scale of non-payment.

The archive supplies the baseline TfL never volunteers. Annex C to the October 2003 fares paper quantified payment rates by mode:

- **Underground** — 80% paid on the spot, 5% later, 15% never;

- **Buses** — 50% on the spot, 20% later, 30% never;
- **Tramlink** — 80% eventually paid.

Non-payment was a known, quantified, published problem at 15–30% twenty years ago. Today's rate above 50% network-wide is roughly double the worst mode of 2003, and unlike 2003, the payment rate no longer appears in any TfL publication.

> **DISCREPANCY**
> The FOI penalty fare total for 2025/26 (62,849) differs from the press release total (69,001); the scope difference is unexplained.

5.6 THE PENALTY FARE LEVEL: A COMPLETE HISTORY

DATE	LEVEL	NOTES
1994–95	LU £10 (1994); buses and DLR £5 (1994/95); Tramlink £15/£25 (2000)	"Most Penalty Fares were set 10 years ago" (Board paper, Oct 2003)
March 2004	Standardised across all modes; £20 by 2005	Proposed Oct 2003 (£10 on the spot / £25 deferred); "standardised across all modes to £20" (Commissioner's report, Oct 2005)
11 Jan 2009	£50, reduced to £25 within 21 days	Two-tier powers in TfL Act 2008. Stated aims: deter evasion, encourage prompt payment "and reduce prosecution activity thus focussing attention on more serious cases". Evasion levels did fall.
19 Feb 2012	£80, reduced to £40 within 21 days	Commissioner's report, Mar 2012; evasion "estimated to have cost TfL around £63 million last year"
March 2024	£100	Press release cites deterrence, but most fines now go unpaid

The 2009 justification matters for interpreting the enforcement series: the two-tier penalty fare was explicitly designed in part to reduce prosecution activity by encouraging early payment. Some of the decline from the 2008/09 prosecution peak was therefore policy, not failure — and the policy did reduce evasion. But the chosen substitute (penalty fares promptly paid) has now failed on its own terms, with most fines unpaid and prosecution of non-payment not visibly enforced.

5.7 OFFICER NUMBERS: BROADLY FLAT FOR TWO DECADES

DATE	TFL'S STATED ENFORCEMENT STRENGTH
2001–2006	Successive additions announced: +30 bus revenue protection staff (2001); +50 revenue protection inspectors (2005); +96 officers on buses (2006). But no totals.

DATE	TFL'S STATED ENFORCEMENT STRENGTH
2007–2008	"Over three hundred revenue protection officers working on the bus network, 200 revenue control officers on the Underground" for a total of over 500 (community safety plans, 2007 and 2008)
2010	"Around 500 revenue inspectors patrolling the network" (The Right Direction); ~300 directly managed on-street staff (2010/11 budget; ~280 in the 2011/12 budget)
July 2022	"Approximately 450 officers that undertake revenue activity"; 60 new Revenue Control Officers being recruited.
Sept 2023	"Our team of 450 revenue inspectors" (FOI-1566-2324)
March 2024	"More than 450 officers" (press release)
April 2025	"More than 400 officers who undertake revenue activity on a daily basis"; "more than 500 uniformed officers" — both in the same document, difference unclear.
June 2026	"More than 500 revenue inspectors" (website); 50 additional Transport Support & Enforcement officers announced.

On TfL's own published statements, total enforcement strength today is about what it was in 2010, spread across a network that has since added the Elizabeth line, Superloop, and substantial ridership. The terminology shifts between "revenue inspectors", "uniformed officers" and "Transport Support & Enforcement officers", which do not appear to be the same teams, and TfL publishes no annual FTE series.

It appears that announcements about new officers being recruited are not net additions but routine recruitment to replace natural staff turnover.

5.8 MONEY IN, MONEY OUT

The known enforcement spend was about £22m in 2023/24, comprising £14.2m on the Underground revenue control team plus £7.7m on bus enforcement. TfL says other modes' costs are held by franchisees.

Against that, I find penalty fare and prosecution income of £7.2m (2022/23); penalty fare income of £638k on the Underground and £707k on buses (2023/24); Revenue Inspection Charges from contactless checks of £2.2m (2024/25) rising to £5.4m (2025/26); and court awards of £2.6m (2025/26).

Enforcement need not pay for itself — the point is to deter lawbreaking — but the gap between £22m of spend, £190m of estimated loss and low single-digit millions recovered is the context for the statistics about activity. Compare those recent figures with the 2005–16 series, where recovery reached £30m a year against gross losses of ~£85m.

YEAR	TFL'S STATED ANNUAL COST OF EVASION	SOURCE
2003	"around £50m per year"	Board paper, 29 Oct 2003

YEAR	TFL'S STATED ANNUAL COST OF EVASION	SOURCE
2008/09	"Fare evasion costs Londoners £70m a year"	TfL Annual Report (Board, 24 Jun 2009)
2011	"around £63 million last year"	Commissioner's report, 15 Mar 2012
2005–2016	Gross £76.5m → £86.1m (3.4% → 1.9% of fares income); net £69.7m → £55.7m	MQT 2017/4488 appendix (section 4.4)
2018/19	£116m (incl. ticket fraud)	FOI-2734-1920
2022/23 →	**"circa £130m" → "circa £190m"**	**TfL website; FOI-0889-2526**

The board-paper figures cross-check the MQT series (£63m for 2011 sits between that year's net £54.2m and gross £81.5m; £70m for 2008/09 is close to the 2009 gross £68.3m). In cash, the estimated loss was broadly stable at £50–80m a year for two decades, far below today's £190m even allowing for fares income growth.

SECTION 6 · THE INFORMATION FIREWALL

06 TRANSPARENCY: HOW THE RECORD WAS PUBLISHED, THEN BURIED

6.1 WHATTFLUSED TO PUBLISH

Between roughly 2003 and 2016, fare evasion data reached the public through at least five routine channels, all documented in the archive:

- **Quarterly survey results** in board and finance papers from at least February 2006, with survey months, methods, and route samples stated.
- **"Appendix Five: Fares avoidance and impact on revenue"** — a standing appendix to the quarterly Operational and Financial Performance Report, created at the direction of the Finance and Policy Committee (action 49/11/10, November 2010), publishing rates for every mode each quarter, with sample sizes and both gross and net measures for the Underground.
- **Published targets** in budgets and business plans (section 3.1), with performance reported against them.
- **Annual Report statements** (e.g. the £70m figure and penalty fare changes, 2009) and strategy documents with full enforcement statistics (The Right Direction, 2010).
- **MQT answers** releasing the full 2005–2016 survey series, by mode, in cash and percentage terms, twice (2016/2153 and 2017/4488).

6.2 HOW EACH CHANNEL STOPPED

Every one of these channels was discontinued, none with a recorded decision or explanation. Appendix Five last appeared with the Q4 2011/12 report (June 2012). Published numeric targets fade from budgets after 2009/10. The MQT series stopped because the Mayor stopped answering: asked in March 2020 for 2017–2019 (MQ 2020/1418), he promised the data "once the methodology is finalised" but never provided it.

> **TfL's published webpage now starts the record at 2022/23.**

6.3 WHAT TFL REFUSES NOW

When asked for the underlying data today, TfL declines. It refused an Assembly request for the top 20 stations for recorded evasion; refused to publish ITAP volume data; refused (under FOI exemptions) its gateline procedures; and pleaded the FOI cost limit when asked for historic gate-pushing, prosecution and cost figures back to 2010. This briefing shows that these are figures which its own board papers used to publish.

6.4 IS THE APPROACH DATA-DRIVEN?

TfL's answer is yes: its strategy describes a "data led", "target driven" approach; its Irregular Travel Analysis Platform (ITAP, established 2017) mines ticketing, gateline, and CCTV data to identify the worst offenders and hotspots. The architecture exists — indeed intelligence-led tasking of revenue officers appears in TfL plans as far back as the 2009/10 Community Safety Plan.

The throughput is the problem. The published outputs of the intelligence-led approach are: 65 individuals investigated in spring 2022; 421 investigated in 2023 (over 50,000 journeys, £300k of fares); 414 identified in 2024 (£363k); and 360 prolific evaders prosecuted with £400k+ awarded in the year to April 2025. Set against an estimated £190m annual loss, the prolific-offender programme touches well under 1% of the problem by value, and TfL publishes no analysis of what share of evasion is attributable to repeat offenders or locations.

> **For a data-led strategy "it is surprisingly data light" and "the headlines are all there, but the substance is missing".**
> London TravelWatch Chief Executive, Transport Committee session, 8 July 2025

Independent scrutiny reached a similar verdict. TravelWatch's own survey found 80% of Londoners think TfL is not doing enough; the evidence I uncovered shows they're right. The Transport Committee's September 2025 letter recommended TfL publish five years of consistent data with the financial resources committed, monitor and report unstaffed gateline openings, and provide annual progress updates against the target starting January 2026.

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SECTION 7 · FOR CREDIBILITY

DISCREPANCIES AND CAUTIONS

For credibility,the following should be acknowledged when using this material. There are now at least four measurement regimes in the record — the board-published estimates of 2003–2012 (mixed measures), the 2005–16 survey series (share of fares income), the 2018/19–2019/20 FOI estimates (mode-specific methods), and the journey-based measure used since 2022/23 — and comparisons across them are indicative only. What carries full weight is the trend within each: a fall of nearly two-thirds within the 2005–16 series, and a flat rate within the post-2022 series.

Specific discrepancies. TfL states 2023/24 as both 3.8% and 3.9%. The April 2025 release quoted 3.4% using nine months' data; the full-year figure was 3.5%. TfL's own FOI puts the loss at circa £190m for 2023/24 while the April 2025 release still cited £130m. Conviction and prosecution figures mix calendar and financial years. The FOI penalty fare total for 2025/26 (62,849) differs from the press release total (69,001). The 2008/09 enforcement figures are bus and Tube only (making the comparison with today conservative). The 2005–16 series measures revenue loss, not journeys; TfL's footnotes warn each mode was calculated differently; coverage widened as TfL took on new modes; and the year labels are not stated as calendar or financial. The LU survey net-loss figures of 2010–12 are volatile between surveys (0.8–1.6%) and are best quoted as a range. Where a board paper says "last year" (the £63m figure) the exact period is not stated.

THE CENTRAL RECORD STANDS

None of these caveats rescues the central record: a 1% target for 2024/25, an outturn of 3.5%, a replacement target 50% higher with a deadline five to six years later, a flat first year under the new ("refreshed") strategy, enforcement at about half its own historical level, and a publication record that makes it very hard to spot the trends.

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SECTION 8 · THE PAPER TRAIL

SOURCES

8.1 CURRENTERA (2019–2026)

- TfL,*Tacklingfareevasion* (rates 2022/23–2025/26, enforcement outcomes, strategy) — tfl.gov.uk/corporate/protecting-our-network/security-on-the-network/tackling-fare-evasion
- TfL press releases: 10 June 2026 (crackdown; 69,001 penalty fares; 14,406 convictions); 30 April 2025 (new measures to halve fare evasion); 5 March 2024 (penalty fare to £100; £7.2m recovered).
- TfL, *Revenue protection – our strategic approach, summary* (April 2025) — content.tfl.gov.uk/revenue-protection-our-strategic-approach-summary.pdf
- TfL CSOPP paper, 13 July 2022 (2019 RPP and "halve by 2024"; 450 officers; ITAP) — board.tfl.gov.uk/documents/s18166/csopp-20220713-item08a-customer-safety-security.pdf
- Evening Standard, 13 July 2022 (1% by 2024/25 reported) — standard.co.uk/news/london/tube-london-underground-chronic-fare-dodgers-b1012572.html
- TfL Commissioner's Reports: 18 October 2023 (p.33, "two-thirds, to under 1.5 per cent by 2030"); February 2025 (pull-quote); 11 June 2025 ("refreshed") — board.tfl.gov.uk/ieListDocuments.aspx?CId=96
- TfL Board summaries of CSOPP meetings, 25 July 2023 and 13 December 2023 — board.tfl.gov.uk/ieListMeetings.aspx?CId=96
- FOI responses: FOI-2734-1920 (Jan 2020: pre-pandemic rates; £116m); FOI-2899-2425 (Jan 2025: LU series 2013/14–2024/25; £14.2m/£7.7m costs; "no analysis... until 2022/23"); FOI-1566-2324 (Sept 2023: 3.9%; £130m; 450 inspectors); FOI-4175-2425 (Apr 2025); FOI-0889-2526 (Jul 2025: prosecutions by mode; £188–190m);
- FOI-4525-2324 (court outcomes); FOI-4638-2324 (Byelaws/SJP) — all at tfl.gov.uk/corporate/transparency/freedom-of-information/
- MQT answers: 2016/2153 and 2017/4488 with Appendix 4488_14 (the 2005–2016 survey series); 2020/1418 (answered 6 May 2020: update promised "once the methodology is finalised", never provided); 2024/3855 (26 Nov 2024); 2025/0194 (21 Jan 2025); 2025/1826 (hotspots refused); 2025/1808 (ITAP refused); 2025/1830 (methodology) — london.gov.uk/questions
- Guido Fawkes, 1 June 2026 (FOI: >50% of fines unpaid; internal LU target 4.1%) — order-order.com/2026/06/01/exc-more-than-half-of-tfl-fines-going-unpaid/
- City AM, 12 August 2024 (£14.2m LU spend vs £638k recouped); Evening Standard via inkl, Feb 2024 (29,113 prosecutions 2019/20).
- London Assembly Transport Committee letters to TfL and BTP, 2 September 2025 (MDA 1757); Transport Committee session, 8 July 2025 (TravelWatch evidence).
- Thomas Turrell AM, *Stolen Millions: How Fare Evasion Robs London*, November 2025 — cityhallconservatives.com/post/stolenmillionsfareevasion

8.2 PRE-2019 TFL BOARD ARCHIVE

- Board, 29 Oct 2003 (fares proposals for 2004, section 7 and Annex C): £50m estimate; penalty fare history; Tables C1–C4 (issuance volumes including ~360,000 LU penalty fares in 2000; payment rates by mode; avoidance by mode). Minutes, 11 Feb 2004 (82/02/04).
- Board, 26 Oct 2005 (Commissioner's report para 2.60: £20 standardisation; two-tier proposal). Board, 8 Feb 2006 and 24 May 2006 (quarterly bus survey results).

- Board, 29 Mar 2006 (budget: +96 bus revenue officers; Silverlink >15%; concession revenue protection targets). Board, 28 Mar 2007 (business plan: <3.2% network bus target; 95% prosecution success).
- Board, 20 Sep 2006 (TfL Prosecution Policy: offences, TIRA forms, warning letters, penalty fare non-payment prosecution).
- Board, 25 Jun 2008 (Overground ticketless 3.8% → 2.7%; ~15% pre-concession). Board, 5 Nov 2008 and minutes 10 Dec 2008 (two-tier £50/£25 from 11 Jan 2009; aims include reduced prosecution activity).
- Board, 31 Mar 2009 (Budget 2009/10: bus targets 1.4%/8.3%; "formerly known as fare evasion"). Board, 24 Jun 2009 (Annual Report: £70m a year).
- Board, 4 Nov 2010 (The Right Direction: 2008/09 prosecutions and penalty fares; ~500 inspectors; Tube 4% → just over 1%; Overground 18%+ → 2%).
- Board, 29 Jun 2011; 21 Sep 2011; 7 Dec 2011; 2 Feb 2012; 27 Jun 2012 (OFR/IPR reports, Appendix Five: Fares avoidance and impact on revenue — created by Finance and Policy Committee action 49/11/10).
- Board, 15 Mar 2012 (Commissioner's report: penalty fare £80; £63m). Board, 3 Jul 2014 (bus "lowest ever"; Overground 1.69%).
- Board, 19 Jul 2016 (Overground concession: 2% contractual target). Board, 22 Sep 2016 (suburban rail: 12.6% → 1.8%, 86% reduction; West Anglia 14.5% → 2.1%).
- Audit & Assurance, 18 Dec 2013 and 5 Mar 2014 (revenue protection audit suite: Tramlink 5% checking requirement; DLR 3% trigger never exceeded; Priority issues on penalty fare documentation and on write-off/reporting of unpaid penalty fares).
- Board, 30 May 2007 and 30 Sep 2008 (community safety plans: 300+ bus / 200 LU officers; one in ten stopped for fare evasion of interest to police).

METHOD

All figures are TfL's own unless stated. Compiled from TfL board and panel papers, press releases, Freedom of Information responses, Mayor's Question Time answers, and London Assembly Transport Committee correspondence, with the assistance of Claude Fable 5.